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A note on terminology 
There is much current debate regarding the terminology related to autism. This chapter will resist 
people-first phrasing, in accordance with other autistic authors (Sinclair, 1993; Sainsbury, 2000): 
 
 “tĞĂƌĞŶŽƚƉĞŽƉůĞǁŚŽ “ũƵƐƚŚĂƉƉĞŶƚŽŚĂǀĞĂƵƚŝƐŵ ? ?ŝƚŝƐŶŽƚĂŶĂƉƉĞŶĚĂŐĞƚŚĂƚĐĂŶďĞ 
separated from who we are as people, nor is it something shameful that has to be reduced to a sub-
ĐůĂƵƐĞ ? ?(Sainsbury, 2000: 12). 
 
For most of the twentieth century autism was considered to be an extremely rare disorder, affecting 
a tiny proportion of the population, however in recent decades the numbers of those diagnosed or 
self-identifying as autistic has risen exponentially, with estimated figures of more than 1 in 100 
(Brugha, 2012). Autism has been variously described as everything from an evil spirit that robs 
parents of their children, to a differing cognitive style, or even a fundamental asset to human 
evolution. The spectrum of ways in which autistic people can present to educational and clinical 
ƉƌĂĐƚŝƚŝŽŶĞƌƐŝƐƐŽŵǇƌŝĂĚ ?ƚŚĂƚŝƚŵĂǇďĞůŝƚƚůĞǁŽŶĚĞƌƚŚĂƚŚĞ ‘ĞŶŝŐŵĂ ? ?&ƌŝƚŚ ? ? ? ? ? ?ƐƚŝůůĞǀĂĚĞƐ
simplistic descriptions, as scientists search in vain for what exactly autism is. Although various 
attempts have been made to categorise differing subgroups of the autism spectrum, e.g.  ‘Asperger 
Syndrome ?,  ‘low-functioning autism ?,  ‘atypical autism ?; it is highly questionable as to how accurately 
such distinctions can be made and how useful they are in practice. 
 
When looking at educational theory and practice, as Scrimshaw (1983) suggests, there is hardly any 
agreement either. What educational supports one decides to put in place will be highly dependent 
on how one conceives of education and the learning process in the first place, and therefore the 
nature of human beings. Consequently, how one sees autism will have a fundamental impact on how 
one seeks to address the educational needs of autistic people.  
 
There is often an assumption that children and young people on the autism spectrum need to live 
and act like those who are not autistic. Many autistic adults take exception to this assumption and 
the fact that mucŚůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞŽŶĂƵƚŝƐŵƵƐĞƐŵĞĚŝĐĂůƚĞƌŵƐƐƵĐŚĂƐ ‘ĚĞĨŝĐŝƚ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĚŝƐŽƌĚĞƌ ? ?tŝƚŚŝŶ
this chapter, both medical and social models of disability, and even post-social models of disability, 
will be considered in relation to autism, and how deficit models have become dominant in narratives 
regarding autism. Further, it will explore alternatives to these approaches. How we think about 
autism relates to the language and terminology we use to describe it. There are also links between 
how we define autism, the educational approaches we use, and finally, how we can build 
understanding across dispositional and ideological divides. 
 
Models of disability and how they apply to autism 
 
The origins of the social model of disability can be traced back to a publication made by the Union of 
the Physically Impaired Against Segregation (UPIAS) in 1976, entitled: The Fundamental Principles of 
Disability, in which it was stated: 
 
 “/ŶŽƵƌǀŝĞǁŝƚ is society which disables physically impaired people. Disability is something imposed 
on top of our impairments by the way we are unnecessarily isolated and excluded from full 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ? ?(UPIAS 1976:14). 
 
The social model of disability was proposed by Oliver (1990) and conceived in opposition to the 
traditional medical model of disability, which framed disability in terms of the remediation of 
individual biological impairments (Safilios-Rothschild, 1970). As Oliver (2004) states, the main 
intention at this time was to shift the focus of practical intervention away from targeting 
remediation and towards the changing of professional practice. According to a social model of 
disability, individual biological impairment is not seen as the root cause of disability, but rather that 
within a society designed to accommodate the needs of those with more typical ways of moving, 
communicating and thinking, those who are atypical are discriminated against. Thus, society has a 
responsibility to seek to include the needs of all, rather than excluding and disabling people who 
have varying impairments.  
 
Within the field of critical disability studies however, the social model of disability has also come 
under criticism. Shakespeare and Watson (2002) argued that there was a need to move beyond a 
social model of disability due to three main criticisms: the issue of impairment, the 
impairment/disability dualism, and the issue of identity. Shakespeare and Watson (ibid) conclude by 
suggesting that we need to consider disability in the ecological context in which the term has 
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚ ?ǁŚĂƚƚŚĞǇƌĞĨĞƌƚŽĂƐ ‘ĂŶĞŵďŽĚŝĞĚŽŶƚŽůŽŐǇŽĨĚŝƐĂďŝůŝƚǇ ?ǁŚŝĐŚƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĐĞŶƚƌĂůƚŽĂ
theoretical account of disability. They argue that the social model creates a binary division, between 
ƚŚĞďŝŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ‘ŝŵƉĂŝƌŵĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƐŽĐŝĂů ‘ĚŝƐĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? ?ĂŶĂůŽŐŽƵƐƚŽƚŚĂƚŵĂĚĞďǇĨĞŵŝŶŝƐƚƐŽǀĞƌƐĞǆ
and gender (Oakley, 1972), a conceptual split that has since been largely abandoned (e.g. Butler, 
1990). Impairment, by the same token, cannot be theorised as something pre-social (Thomas, 1999). 
Whilst acknowledging how useful the social model had been as a political tool, Shakespeare and 
Watson (2002) found it inadequate as a basis for a social theory of disability.   
 
However, Oliver (2004) defended the social model and its practical/political ethos. He discussed five 
criticisms, from the disability movement and disability studies, often levied at the social model of 
disability. The first criticism was that the social model ignored, or failed to adequately account for, 
the realities of living with an impairment (Shakespeare and Watson, 2002). Oliver countered this by 
saying that the social model was about the collective experience of disability. By making such claims, 
Oliver (1996) frames disability as a public/social issue rather than a personal trouble (Mills, 1956), 
yet he does not give a theoretical account of impairments or their potential effects. As Oliver (1996) 
suggests, support for the social model of disability, does not mean that interventions based on 
remediation of specific impairments are of no use, or always counter-productive, but just means a 
ƐŚŝĨƚŝŶĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶĂǁĂǇĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨŽŶĞ ?ƐƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨĚŝƐĂďility.  
 
A second criticism is that subjective experiences of impairment and disability are ignored by the 
social model (Crow, 1996). This is countered by the social model having arisen from disability 
activism. A third criticism is that the social model is not able to adequately account for intersections 
with other social divisions, such as gender or ageing. Oliver (2004) responds by suggesting, that if 
this has not been the case, then it would be better for theorists to put their efforts into solving such 
perceived failures rather than by apportioning this failure to the social model or disability activists 
alone.  
 
A fourth critique comes from postmodern theory, which regards disability as residing primarily in 
ĐƵůƚƵƌĂůƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶƐǀŝĞǁŝŶŐĚŝƐĂďůĞĚƉĞŽƉůĞĂƐ ‘ŽƚŚĞƌ ? ?tŚŝůƐƚƚŚŝƐƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐĂĐŽŵŵŽŶƚĞŶƐŝŽŶ
between postmodern and more materialist theories of society, Oliver (2004) suggests correctly that 
materialist social model theories do not discount cultural factors, but may not afford them the same 
primacy. The final criticism is whether the social model is an adequate theory of disablement. Oliver 
(2004) counters this by suggesting that these debates should not be seen just as academic disputes, 
because of the political and practical ethos of those who originated the social model. Implementing 
a social model may be difficult, however, if people disagree as to what that entails, or how to 
implement it practically. Theoretical debates are not without practical import. Whilst the social 
model of disability can be an empowering tool for autistic people one still needs to try to build upon 
any working theory of disability. 
 
Cadman (2010) examined the ethical issues involved in applying models of disability to the field of 
autism. He discusses how contrasting theoretical and ethical concerns imply differing practicalities, 
e.g. the acceptability of behavioural interventions and the allocation of resources. For Cadman 
(2010), according to a traditional medical model, autism would be viewed as inherently limited to 
social functioning  W Ă ‘ŚĂƌŵĞĚĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶ ? ?,ĂƌƌŝƐ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĐŝƚĞĚĂĚŵĂŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?dŚŝƐŝƐĐŽƵŶƚĞƌĞĚďǇ
autistic activists and scholars as a categorical error of normative thinking. Such a view of autism and 
humanity reifies normalcy as the ideal, with any deviation from normalcy seen as a pathology to be 
ƌĞŵĞĚŝĂƚĞĚ ?dŚŽƐĞĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐĂǀŝĞǁĂŬŝŶƚŽĂ ‘ŶĞƵƌŽĚŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵ ? ?tĂůŬĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ǁŽƵůĚǀŝĞǁ
what we call autism as part of a wider diversity of neurological development and a discriminated 
against minority, with many activists taking on a social model (or post-social model) of disability and 
autism. From such a viewpoint, one could critique the notion of autism being a medical condition in 
need of remediation, but view it instead as an aspect of human life that is being ill-catered for 
socially. For Cadman (2010), neither a traditional medical or social model is satisfactory. Cadman 
(2010) suggests certain things can be considered either good or bad for a person, regardless of their 
own attitudes towards those things (even if such a view can be considered paternalistic). The 
ĂŵŽƵŶƚŽŶĞĐĂŶĂŶĚƐŚŽƵůĚŝŵƉŽƐĞŽŶĞ ?ƐƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐŽŶŽƚŚĞƌƐŝƐĐĞƌƚĂŝŶůǇĂŶŝƐƐƵĞĂŶǇƉĂƌĞŶƚŽĨĂ
child (autistic or otherwise) or professional working with autistic people needs to reflect upon.  
 
For autistic scholar and activist Steve Graby (2012), autism can be said to fall between the 
ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝĞƐŽĨ ‘ŝŵƉĂŝƌŵĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĚŝƐĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? ?ǁŝƚŚĂĐƚŝǀŝƐƚƐƌĞĐůĂŝŵŝŶŐǁŚĂƚŝƐĂůƐŽĂ
medical categorisation as a cultural identity. Graby (2012) suggests that where impairment-specific 
organisations exist, they usually follow an individual/medical model approach and thus are often 
frowned upon by those following a social model of disability, where differences between 
impairments are viewed as less important than an analysis of social disablement. Autistic activists 
however, commonly draw upon a social model of disability (Milton, 2016), whilst also referring to 
autism-specific issues. For Graby (2012), there are a number of considerations when looking at 
ĂƵƚŝƐŵĂŶĚĂƵƚŝƐƚŝĐƉĞŽƉůĞ P ?ĨŝƌƐƚůǇ ?ĂƵƚŝƐŵŝƐĚĞĨŝŶĞĚŵĞĚŝĐĂůůǇĂƐĂ ‘ƐŽĐŝĂůŝŵƉĂŝƌŵĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ
might be seen as in need of sociological analysis; secondly, there is the creation of autistic culture, 
communities and political movements, and finally, the significant reclaiming of what autism pertains 
to, and the cultural acceptance within autistic communities of peer recognition and self-diagnosis. 
Importantly, Graby (2012) also points out that not all autistic people personally identify as being 
 ‘ĚŝƐĂďůĞĚ ? ?ǁŝƚŚĂƵƚŝƐŵŽĨƚĞŶďĞŝŶŐƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚĂƐĂĐŽŐŶŝƚŝǀĞĂŶĚĐƵůƚƵƌĂůŵŝŶŽƌŝƚǇƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶďĞŝŶŐ
seen as a set of impairments. Graby (2012) illustrates a linguistic difference, in that when one refers 
ƚŽ ‘ĚŝƐĂďůĞĚƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ŽŶĞŝƐĨƌĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚŝŶŐƚŚŝŶŐƐ ‘ĚŽŶĞƚŽ ?ĂƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĂƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞ
ĂĨĨŝƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ ?ĂƐŝƐƚŚĞĐĂƐĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨ ‘ĂƵƚŝƐ ĐƉĞƌƐŽŶ ? ?^ƵĐŚĂǀŝĞǁŽĨĂƵƚŝƐŵŝƐŵŽƌĞ
ĂŬŝŶƚŽƚŚĞ ‘ĂĨĨŝƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŵŽĚĞůŽĨĚŝƐĂďŝůŝƚǇ ?ĂƐƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚďǇ^ǁĂŝŶĂŶĚ&ƌĞŶĐŚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚ
by Cameron (2008). In this sense, autism is seen as a natural aspect of human diversity. 
 
Deficit models of autism and alternative explanations 
 
One of the most important developments in the history of autism was the work of Wing and Gould 
(1979) and the subsequent widening of the autism spectrum to include Asperger syndrome.  This 
work largely created the discourse of a triad of impairments in autism: social communication, social 
interaction, and social imagination (repetitive interests/activities). 
 
 “ƵƚŝƐƚŝĐĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶĚŽŚĂǀĞŝŵĂŐŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ďƵƚŝƚŝƐŶŽƚƐŽĐŝĂů ? ?(Wing, cited in Feinstein, 2010: 152). 
 
ƵƚŝƐŵŚĂƐƐŝŶĐĞďĞĐŽŵĞĚĞĨŝŶĞĚĂƐƉƌŝŵĂƌŝůǇĂƐŽĐŝĂů ‘ĚŝƐŽƌĚĞƌ ? ?ǁŝƚŚŽƚŚĞƌŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨ
autistic experience having received relatively less attention, such as sensory processing, being 
absent in diagnostic criteria until fairly recently (DSM-V: APA, 2013). A diagnosis of autism is 
dependent on a clinician perceiving a client to be both dysfunctional in terms of normative 
communication and interaction, and in terms of perceived repetitive behaviours and interests being 
observed. 
 
DŽĚĞůƐŽĨĂƵƚŝƐŵƚŚĂƚĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽĞǆƉůĂŝŶǁŚĂƚĂƵƚŝƐŵ ‘ŝƐ ? ?ŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶĚŽŵŝŶĂƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐ
originating in cognitive-psychological theorising. These models include: theory of mind deficit, 
executive dysfunction, weak coherence theory, and empathising-systemising theory. All of these 
theories have been previously criticised by autistic scholars (Lawson, 2010; Milton, 2012a, 2012b) for 
their lack of universality, specificity, and explanatory power in describing autism.  According to 
autistic scholars and activists drawing upon social and/or post-social models of disability (Lawson, 
2010; Arnold, 2012; Milton, 2012a, 2012b; Graby, 2012), autism can be seen both as a social 
construction and as a description of an embodied and culturally filtered experience. Therefore, 
presenting autism as purely a set of behavioural and cognitive deficits, does not take into account 
the disabling affects that any given society or context holds for autistic people. 
 
 “ůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂďŝŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĂƐƉĞĐƚƚŽƚŚŝƐĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶŶĂŵĞĚĂƵƚŝƐŵ ?ƚŚĞƐŽĐŝĂůĨĂĐƚŽƌƐŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚŝŶŝƚƐ
identification, representation, interpretation, remediation, and performance are the most important 
factors in the determination of what it means to be autistic, for individuals, for families and for 
ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ? ?(Nadesan, 2005: 2). 
 
According to Nadesan (2005), the emerging dominance of cognitive psychology in the late 20
th
 
century narrowed the frame of what was considered normal and pathologised behaviours that had 
ŚŝƚŚĞƌƚŽĞƐĐĂƉĞĚƚŚĞŵĞĚŝĐĂů ?ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐŐĂǌĞ ?^ŚĞĂůƐŽƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶĞĚtŝŶŐ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚĂ
shift to a cognitive understanding of autism had been an advance in knowledge, but instead 
represented socially and historically situated ways of knowing.   
 
Nadesan (2005) argues that constructing an ontological divergence between autistic and neuro-
typical people, creates the impression of two separate and ontologically homogenous groups, 
reducing individual differences expressed at the level of mind (open to social influence) to the level 
ŽĨƚŚĞďƌĂŝŶ ?ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞǇĂƌĞĨŝǆĞĚ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚĚĞƐƉŝƚĞĐĞůĞďƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ ‘ĂƵƚŝƐƚŝĐŐĞŶŝƵƐ ? ?ƉĞŽƉůĞǁŝƚŚ
autism know that their difference is ultimately devalued in relation to neuro-typical cultural 
normality.  In widening the spectrum of what can be considered autistic however, Wing and Gould 
(1979) also opened up the possibility for autistic self-advocacy at an individual and group level, in 
terms of the numbers of people diagnosed and their potential capacity to communicate with one 
another.  By opening up a public discourse about neurological diversity, it has enabled a cultural 
space for people on the autism spectrum to interact with one another, resist medical model 
descriptions of themselves, and to begin to build an autistic culture. 
 
Timimi et al. (2011) charge the autistic rights movement with not considering the implications of 
ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŝŶŐƚŚĞůĂďĞůĂƐĂ ‘ĚŝĨĨ-ĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚƐĞůĨ-fulfilling prophecy of seeing oneself as 
genetically different in terms of empathy.  They warn of the dangers of the autistic rights movement 
staying loyal to the pseudoscience supporting the concept, unaware that many in the movement 
challenge the concept of the medical model of autism (Lawson, 2008; Arnold, 2010; Milton, 2012a; 
2012b). Timimi et al. (2011) argue that the autism label is likely to produce a distraction from a full 
ĂƉƉƌĞĐŝĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚŝƐǀŝĞǁŝƐĞƋƵĂůůǇƐƵďũĞĐƚƚŽƚŚĞĚŝĂŐŶŽƐƚŝĐ
procedures that it is discrediting. What Timimi et al. (2011) fail to acknowledge, is that a lack of a 
universal positive consequence from receiving the label for all autistic people, is not a good enough 
reason to abolish its use, at least without replacing it with something more beneficial. 
 
Autistic scholars and activists (Graby, 2012; Milton, 2015) have argued that impairment is a culturally 
constructed and normative category, yet do not deny the significance of embodied experiences and 
diversity, seeing impairment as relative and not absolute, and are thus more akin to a post-social 
model of autism and disability. Views regarding autism held by autistic people are of course hugely 
varied, yet there is evidence that a critical / social model of disability is a strongly and widely held 
viewpoint (Milton, 2016). Both historically and more recently, a number of theories have arisen from 
autistic scholars themselves to try and explain autistic ways of thinking, perceiving and being in the 
world. Many of these theories have received less attention than the dominant cognitive theories of 




Originating in the work of Dinah Murray (Murray, 1992; Murray et al., 2005) and influencing the 
work of Wenn Lawson (2010), the theory of monotropism conteŶĚƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĂŵŽƵŶƚŽĨ ‘ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ?Žƌ
perceptual attention available to a person at any one time is a limited resource, and that within the 
differing cognitive neurodivergent profile associated with autism, one often finds a tendency toward 
Ă ‘ŵŽŶŽƚƌŽƉŝĐ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĂ ‘ƉŽůǇƚƌŽƉŝĐ ?ĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƐƚǇůĞ ?^ƵĐŚĂ ‘ŵŽŶŽƚƌŽƉŝĐ ?ƐƚǇůĞŽĨĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƵƐĞŝƐ
ůŝŬĞŶĞĚƚŽĂŶŝŶƚĞŶƐĞ ‘ƚŽƌĐŚďĞĂŵ ?ĂƐŽƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽĂ ‘ĚŝĨĨƵƐĞĚůŝŐŚƚ ? ?DƵƌƌĂǇĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƚŚĂƚ
social interaction, the use of language, and the shifting of object attention (implicated by the 
dominant psychological explanations of autism) are all tasks that require broader attention, and are 
ŝŶŚŝďŝƚĞĚďǇĂŚŝŐŚůǇĨŽĐƵƐĞĚŽƌ ‘ĐĂŶĂůŝƐĞĚ ?ƵƐĞŽĨĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ ?ŽƌŝŶĚĞĞĚ ?ŽĨĂǁĂǇŽĨŵĂŶĂŐŝŶŐƐĞŶƐŽƌǇ
input). 
 
The theory of monotropism can perhaps help to shed light on a number of experiences often relayed 
in autistic accounts but not attended to by other theories. For instance, it helps explain the tendency 
autistic people have to passionately follow their interests, or to completely lack motivation in a given 
ƚĂƐŬ ?ŽƌŚŽǁĂƐƵĚĚĞŶĂŶĚƵŶĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚĐŚĂŶŐĞ ‘ǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůƚƵŶŶĞů ?ĐŽƵůĚůĞĂĚƚŽĂŚŝŐŚůǇ
stressful disconnection from a previously  ‘safe ? state of mind. 
 
 “tĞƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƵŶĞǀĞŶƐŬŝůůƐƉƌŽĨŝůĞŝŶĂƵƚŝƐm depends on which interests have been fired into 
ŵŽŶŽƚƌŽƉŝĐƐƵƉĞƌĚƌŝǀĞĂŶĚǁŚŝĐŚŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶůĞĨƚƵŶƐƚŝŵƵůĂƚĞĚďǇĂŶǇĨĞůƚĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ? ?(Murray et al. 
2005: 143). 
 
According to the theory of monotropism, important differences occur with regard to development 
and experiences pursuant to which particular interests are followed at certain points in the life 
course, and which are suffocated by negative experiences when attempting to engage in them. It is 
also suggested that if an autistic person is employing a monotropic interest system, the ability to use 
information gained in the past is compromised, as information is gained only in relation to a narrow 
ƐĞƚŽĨŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ?dŚƵƐ ‘ƚŽƉ-ĚŽǁŶ ?Žƌ ‘ǁŚŽůĞƉŝĐƚƵƌĞ ?ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŝŶŐŝƐŶŽƚ ‘ĚŝƐƉƌĞĨĞƌĚ ?ĂƐƐƵĐŚ ?ďƵƚǁŝůů
tend to be idiosyncratic and resistant to change or criticism.   
 
Filling in the Gaps 
 
Utilising social psychological theory, Milton (2013) suggested that autistic people may have a 
tendency to use information perceived in the present, rather than mental schema built up from 
ƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐĂŶĚ ‘ǁŚŽůĞƉŝĐƚƵƌĞ ?ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŝŶŐ ?^ƵĐŚĂƚŚĞŽƌŝƐŝŶŐŽĨĂƵƚŝƐƚŝĐƉĞƌĐĞƉƚƵĂů
differences was also postulated by Pellicano and Burr (2012). When theorists and academics from 
differing disciplines and using differing methods come to similar conclusions, perhaps this indicates a 
need for further exploration? 
 
The Double Empathy Problem 
 
Due to the cognitive and dispositional diversity attested to in theories ranging from executive 
functioning theory to monotropism (Milton, 2012a), coupled with the numerous accounts of autistic 
authors (such as Sinclair, 1992)  W DŝůƚŽŶ ? ? ? ? ?ď ?ƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚƚŚĂƚƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŚĞ ‘ƚŚĞŽƌǇŽĨŵŝŶĚ ?Žƌ
 ‘ĞŵƉĂƚŚǇ ?ƉƌŽďůĞŵƐĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚĂƵƚŝƐŵďĞŝŶŐƐŽůĞůǇůŽĐĂƚĂďůĞŝŶƚŚĞĂƵƚŝƐƚŝĐďƌĂŝŶ ?ŵŝŶĚ ?ƚŚĂƚ
such dŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚŝĞƐǁĞƌĞƌĞĐŝƉƌŽĐĂůŝŶŶĂƚƵƌĞ ?Ă ‘ĚŽƵďůĞĞŵƉĂƚŚǇƉƌŽďůĞŵ ?ĞǆŝƐƚƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƚǁŽ
parties. This theory suggests that it is both the autistic and non-autistic person who can struggle to 
understand and relate to the experiences and perceptions of the other. This theory has been 
reflected and expanded upon by other autistic theorists (Chown, 2014) and is also beginning to be 
reflected in empirical evidence (Sheppard et al. 2015). 
 How one defines autism and educational priorities 
 
 “'ƌĂŶƚŵĞƚŚĞĚŝŐŶŝƚǇof meeting me on my own terms...Recognise that we are equally alien to each 
ŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƚŚĂƚŵǇǁĂǇƐŽĨďĞŝŶŐĂƌĞŶŽƚŵĞƌĞůǇĚĂŵĂŐĞĚǀĞƌƐŝŽŶƐŽĨǇŽƵƌƐ ? ?(Sinclair, 1993). 
 
From the early days of autistic self-advocacy movements a case has been made to use identity-first 
rather than person-first language, i.e. autistic person (Sinclair, 1999). Such a language preference 
ƵƐƵĂůůǇŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞƐĂƌĞũĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨŵĞĚŝĐĂůŵŽĚĞůĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŽŶƐŽĨǁŚĂƚŝƚŵĞĂŶƐƚŽďĞ ‘ĂƵƚŝƐƚŝĐ ?in favour of 
Ă ‘ŶĞƵƌŽĚŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵ ?ŽĨƐŽŵĞƐort. Of course, not all people with a diagnosis of autism choose 
to use this language and indeed some are likely to use a medical model narrative. Kenny et al. (2015) 
conducted a survey of UK stakeholders in the field of autism to enquire about preferences in the use 
ŽĨůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ?tŚŝůƐƚůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ ‘ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶŝŶŐůĂďĞůƐ ?ǁĂƐůĂƌŐĞůǇĚĞŶŽƵŶĐĞĚďǇĂůů ?ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ
between stakeholder groups were apparent. ŵŽŶŐƐƚĂƵƚŝƐƚŝĐĂĚƵůƚƐ ?ƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ ‘ĂƵƚŝƐƚŝĐ
ƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ǁĂƐƚŚĞŵŽƐƚĐŽŵŵŽŶůǇƉƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚĞƌŵ ?  The most preferred term amongst all 
ƐƚĂŬĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐŽŶĂǀĞƌĂŐĞǁĂƐ ‘ƉĞŽƉůĞŽŶƚŚĞĂƵƚŝƐŵƐƉĞĐƚƌƵŵ ? ? Kenny et al. (2015) concluded that it 
was important for people to use the language that was comfortable for them.   
 
How a person talks about autism often reflects their experience of autism, the materials and 
resources they have had access to, and so on; the language we use can reflect how we think about 
autism.  There are many controversies and differences of view with regard to what autism is, and 
therefore how best to help autistic people. In the production of the National Standards for Schools 
stakeholder groups were surveyed for their views regarding educational priorities for autistic 
children and young people (Milton and Giannadou, 2012). These consultations found that there 
were similarities in priorities reported: a curriculum tailored to individual need, good communication 
between staff and parents, and staff training.  Yet there were also significant differences found. 
Parents of autistic children often highlighted communication with staff as fundamentally important. 
Autistic children and young people however mentioned the experience of being bullied above any 
other factor. This group also reported more frequently issues regarding the school environment, 
such as navigating crowds and having sufficient personal space. Whilst parents and practitioners 
ŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚĞĚƚŚĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŽĨƚĞĂĐŚŝŶŐ ‘ƐŽĐŝĂůƐŬŝůůƐ ? ?ƐƵĐŚĂƉŚƌĂƐĞǁĂƐŵŝƐƐŝŶŐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐŽĨ
the autistic children and young people, who were more likely to discuss issues with particular subject 
areas, or elements of them, such as literacy or the use of words in mathematics questions. The 
autistic young people consulted for this work ranged in age and educational setting. Participation for 
some autistic young people in such exercises can be difficult, and although efforts were made in this 
regard to widen access (through methods such as talking mats and  ‘ƐŵŝůĞǇĨĂĐĞ ?ĐŚŽŝĐĞƐ ? ?the 
reliability of data produced in such ways can be questioned. When examining educational ideology 
and practice with autistic children and young people with severe learning disabilities, the fault lines 
can become even more divisive and fraught (e.g. Milton, 2014; Keenan et al., 2014).  
Milton (2016) conducted a study looking into the educational priorities of stakeholders in the field of 
autism using a Q-sort ranking exercise of forty-two statements. In this sample a wide spread of views 
were found.  However, amongst autistic adults there was a tendency towards either a critical or 
radical pedagogy, or at least a progressive interactionist practice involving pupil or interest-led 
actiǀŝƚŝĞƐ ?tŝƚŚŝŶƚŚŝƐŐƌŽƵƉƚŚĞŵŽƐƚĨĂǀŽƵƌĞĚƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚŽĨĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉƌŝŽƌŝƚǇǁĂƐƚŽ ‘ĐĞůĞďƌĂƚĞ
ůĞĂƌŶĞƌƐĂŶĚŶŽƚĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽŶŽƌŵĂůŝƐĞƚŚĞŵ ? ?ŵŽŶŐƐƚŶŽŶ-autistic parents within this sample there 
was a tendency toward an educational approach akin to Positive Behaviour Support (PBS) with 
ĐŽŵŵŽŶŝƐƐƵĞƐƌĂŝƐĞĚďĞŝŶŐƚŚĞƚĞĂĐŚŝŶŐŽĨ ‘ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƐŽĐŝĂůƐŬŝůůƐ ? ?ĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐ
and practitioners sampled for this study were found to have a less coherent and more eclectic range 
of views that drew upon these two dominant narratives. Consensus within this sample (of just sixty 
people) was rare. Again, issues relating to navigating unfriendly school environments were more 
regularly discussed by autistic participants. All who were sampled were against notions of making 
ĂƵƚŝƐƚŝĐĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ‘ŝŶĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚĂďůĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŝƌƉĞĞƌƐ ? ?dŚĞŵŽƐƚĐŽŵŵŽŶůǇĂŐƌĞĞĚƵƉŽŶƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚďǇ
ĂůůŐƌŽƵƉƐǁĂƐ ‘ŐŽŽĚĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƐƚĂĨĨ ?ƉƵƉŝůƐĂŶĚƉĂƌĞŶƚƐ ? ? 
 
Although ideology and narrative are likely to affect practice, we cannot take this for granted. Jordan 
and Powell (1996) suggest that whatever the ideology of a practitioner, there is a tendency toward 
ǁŚĂƚƚŚĞǇƚĞƌŵ ‘ƚŚĞƌĂƉŝƐƚĚƌŝĨƚ ? ?dŚĞƌĂƉŝƐƚĚƌŝĨƚŽĐĐƵƌƐǁŚĞƌĞƉƌĂĐƚŝƚŝŽŶĞƌƐ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇƚŚŽƐĞƵƚŝůŝƐŝŶŐ
forms of interaction less natural to those receiving an educational intervention, drift toward a more 
natural form of interaction, and conversely, those using a child-centred approach may find 
themselves taking on the role of a professional teacher within cerƚĂŝŶŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƵĞƚŽ ‘ƚŚĞƌĂƉŝƐƚ
ĚƌŝĨƚ ?ĂƐŽƵƚůŝŶĞĚďǇ:ŽƌĚĂŶĂŶĚWŽǁĞůů ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ŝƚŵĂǇďĞƚŚĞĐĂƐĞƚŚĂƚŝŶƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŵŽƌĞ




tĞŶŐĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ?ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞĚƚŚĞŝĚĞĂŽĨ ‘ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐŽĨƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ? ?^ƵĐŚĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐĂƌĞĨŽƌŵĞĚ
whenever a collection of people engage in a process of learning through their activities.  
Communities of practice can have a range of participation available to members, from core 
participants to those on the periphery, but all involved in the community share a level of mutual 
engagement and common activity or interest through which they learn common practices.  Through 
the membership of such groups, participants learn social competencies from interacting with one 
another that distinguish them from other groups, and in doing so, develop a repertoire of resources 
that represent their experiences and practices, and ways of addressing common social issues...  This 
means that members of communities need to engage in relationships with one another over a 
sustained period of time.  As a consequence of being organised around common principles and 
activity, communities of practice can also create a shared sense of identity.  They generate a shared 
repertoire of ideas that become translated into materials, documents, and language.  
 
Like Collins and Evans (2007), Wenger (1998) argues that the acquisition of knowledge can be seen 
as socially situated and contextual.  As members of communities become more competent, they 
ďĞĐŽŵĞ ‘ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŽƌǇĞǆƉĞƌƚƐ ? ?ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞƐĐŚĞŵĂŽĨ ůůŝŶƐĂŶĚǀĂŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Žƌ ‘ĐŽƌĞ
ŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ? ?ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞƐĐŚĞŵĂŽĨtĞŶŐĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?dŚƵƐ ůĞĂƌŶŝŶŐŝƐƐĞĞŶĂƐĂĐĐŽŵƉůŝƐŚĞĚ
through a process of social participation.  Of course, not all communities of practice are equally 
advantageous to all of their members, and some are distorted by unequal power relationships and 
the tight patrolling of membership and participation. 
 
When applied to the field of autism, one can see that a number of communities of practice have 
evolved in relative isolation to one another.  From autistic self-advocacy groups, through 
communities of practice that have developed through a particular academic discipline or paradigm, 
to parent support groups and forums, and professional conferences, one can see that many 
communities of practice exist.  Each of these communities produces their own language, their own 
culture, and their own sets of resources and materials.  The extent that there have been shared 
practices between these communities however has been traditionally at their respective fringes.  
Such a separation of related communities is a significant issue within the field of autism, 
ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞĚďǇƌŶŽůĚ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ƐŝůŽŵĞŶƚĂůŝƚǇ ? ?KŶĞŽĨ ƚŚĞĚŽǁŶƐŝĚĞƐŽĨĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐŽĨ
practice, is that they develop in ways in which their shared competencies, experiences and practices, 
distinguish them from other groups. This provides a sense of identity and pride for their members, 
but mĂǇĂůƐŽĨĞƌŵĞŶƚĂĚŝƐƉĂƌĂŐŝŶŐǀŝĞǁŽĨ ‘ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƌƐ ? ?ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇŝĨƚŚĞǇŚŽůĚŽƉƉŽƐŝŶŐǀŝĞǁƐĂŶĚ
ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐƚŚĂƚĂƌĞƐĞĞŶĂƐĂďŚŽƌƌĞŶƚƚŽƚŚŽƐĞǁŝƚŚŝŶŽŶĞ ?ƐŽǁŶŐƌŽƵƉ ?^ƵĐŚĚŝƐƉĂƌŝƚŝĞƐĐĂŶ
easily lead to apathy, dyspathy (Cameron, 2012), and antipathy and/or stigma toward others.  
dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?ƚŽůŝŵŝƚƚŚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚƐŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƐŝůŽŵĞŶƚĂůŝƚǇ ?ƚŚĞďĂƌƌŝĞƌƐƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐŶĞĞĚ
to be reduced and collaborative communities of practice need to be established in order that 
stakeholders do not feel alienated and disenfranchised. 
 
By including members of teams that occupy differing dispositions and outlooks, one is able to weigh-
up the arguments presented by differing interpretations of the same phenomena or data, and these 
can be openly debated.  Of course, not all stakeholder groups can be said to be content with their 
current level of involvement (ABA4All, 2014; Dillenberger et al., 2015), and perhaps what is needed 
ŝƐƐŽŵĞŬŝŶĚŽĨ ‘ƐƵŵŵŝƚ ?Žƌ ‘ƉĞĂĐĞǁŽƌŬƐŚŽƉ ?ŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽŝŶŝƚŝĂƚĞĐŽŶƚĂĐƚĂŶĚďƵŝůĚĂĐommon 
acceptance, or even an understanding, if not a consensus, of opinion.  Initial attempts at creating 
such discursive spaces can be said to have originated within the autistic community, with examples 
such as the Theorising Autism Project (Greenstein, 2014) that sought to bring together people from 
all stakeholder groups so that they can work interactively.  This project, as well as the Participatory 
Autism Research Collective (PARC) based at London South Bank University have organised seminar 
days with this purpose in mind and been led by autistic people and their concerns, which at this 
stage may well be required to redress the traditional power imbalance between stakeholders in the 
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